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Executive Summary 
This report describes one of the key elements of the European Union C-ITS Security 
Credential Management System (EU CCMS), which is going to support the deployment of 
C-ITS systems and technologies in Europe by implementing the trust model and providing 
the necessary security functions. The EU CCMS is based on central elements to support 
secure interoperability at Europe level. One of the components of the central elements is 
the CPOC protocol, which collects the RCAs certificates and provides them to the Trust List 
Manager (TLM) to create the European Certificate Trust List (ECTL). The CPOC protocol 
was mentioned in the C-ITS certificate policy as an item that was to be defined by the 
CPOC. This report has the objective to cover the definition of the CPOC protocol. 
The content provided in this report is based on the technical deliverable provided by 
OnBoardSecurity on the basis of JRC Service Contract 756189. The technical deliverable 
has been assessed by various stakeholders and discussed in a workshop of 15th of 
November 2018 in Brussels, Belgium. The technical report also summarizes the key 
comments provided by the stakeholders. The scope of this report is the definition of the 
CPOC protocol between the RCAs and the CPOC Entry. 
This report may be revised in the implementation process of the EU CCMS based on the 
needs of the C-ITS stakeholders. 
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Acronyms and Abbreviations 
 
AA Authorisation Authority 
AR Authorised Representative 
CA  Certification Authority  
C-ITS Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems  
CP Certificate Policy 
CPA Certificate Policy Authority 
CPOC C-ITS Point of Contact 
CPS Certificate Practice Statement 
EA Enrolment Authority 
EC Enrolment Credential 
ECTL European Certificate Trust List 
EU CCMS European Union C-ITS Security Credential Management System 
PKI Public Key Infrastructure 
RCA Root Certification Authority 
RCA AR Root Certification Authority Authorised Representative 
TLM Trust List Manager 
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1 Introduction 
On 30th of November 2016 the Commission adopted a Commission Communication: “A 
European strategy on Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems, a milestone towards 
cooperative, connected and automated mobility” (COM (2016) 766). Regarding C-ITS 
security the communication has foreseen a number of important actions to enable 
deployment of C-ITS services in Europe by 2019. 
One of the key actions of the strategy is the design and implementation of a European 
Union C-ITS Security Credential Management System (EU CCMS) for C-ITS messages. The 
implementation of an EU CCMS is urgently needed for European C-ITS deployments, both 
in a first learning and testing phase as well as for any commercial large-scale market 
introduction. 
An important milestone in 2017, was the publication of the C-ITS certificate policy and 
security policy1, which define the key elements of the EU-CCMS and the main entities 
including the central elements. As further stipulated in the Commission Communication 
from 17th of May 2018 “On the road to automated mobility: An EU strategy for mobility of 
the future” (COM(2018) 283) the Commission decided to implement “a pilot on common 
EU-wide cybersecurity infrastructures and processes needed for secure and trustful 
communication between vehicles and infrastructure for road safety and traffic management 
related messages according to the published guidance on the certificate and security 
policy”. 
The first phase of the deployment of the EU CCMS will focus on the development of a 
working prototype of the EU CCMS at European level. In this first phase, the JRC will work 
on the design of the so called “central elements” defined in the C-ITS certificate policy.  
The work will be carried on by unit DG.JRC.E3 to support DG MOVE B.4. and it will consist 
in the development, implementation and deployment of the central elements of the EU 
CCMS, which include (the exact details can be found in the Certificate & Security Policy 
documents): 
 The C-ITS Point of Contact (CPOC), which is a role designed to collect the RCA 
certificates from other European CAs, transmitting them to the TLM and 
publication of the European Certificate Trust List (ECTL). 
 The Trust List Manager (TLM) element, which is the unique entity in the trust 
model that signs and manages the ECTL. The TLM is composed of a secure server 
to sign sets of certificates and other management functionalities. 
 An EU root Certification Authority.  
 
The scope of this report is to define the Central Point of Contact protocol between the RCAs 
and the CPOC Entry.  
The content provided in this report is based on a technical deliverable provided by the 
company ‘OnBoardSecurity’ on the basis of JRC Service Contract 756189 and the 
subsequent comments by the stakeholders in a workshop organized by DG MOVE and DG 
JRC on 15th of November 2018.  
Two options were investigated in the definition of the CPOC protocol: a manual protocol 
where RCA representatives would come physically to the CPOC Entry facilities (hosted in 
on European Commission premises, Joint Research Centre offices in Ispra, Italy) and an 
automatic protocol based on a secure network, with no physical presence needed of the 
RCA representatives. Both the feedback from the OnBoardSecuriy contractor and the JRC 
administration was strongly positive for the manual protocol, i.e. not going for an 
automated process. While the Commission has also received some feedback that after an 
                                           
1 C-ITS Certificate & Security Policy is published and maintained on: https://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/its/c-
its_en 
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initial enrolment of a RCA via the described manual procedure, it should be possible to re-
key/update RCA certificates remotely without continued physical presences during normal 
operation, this option is currently not possible to be implemented by the Commission. 
Consequently, the manual protocol is hence the only option described in this technical 
report to deliver/update root CA certificates to the CPOC, besides a revocation case where 
an additional remote option is described. In case the current framework conditions under 
which the Commission is hosting and operating the CPOC change, the choice of allowed 
protocol may be revised in the future.  
The structure of this report is following: 
Section 2 provides an overall view of the EU CCMS architecture. 
Section 3 is the main part of the report and it describes the CPOC protocol. 
Section 4 provides the conclusions of this report. 
The Annex contains message structures defined in ASN.1 format for potential future use. 
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2 Overall view of the EU C-ITS Security Credential 
Management system architecture (EU-CCMS) 
 
 
Figure 1 High level view of the EU CCMS trust model (from [2]) 
 
The high level functional view of the EU CCMS is provided in Figure 1. The main entities 
and roles are described in [2] and they are briefly reported here: 
 
Trust List Manager 
The TLM is a unique entity appointed by the Policy Authority. 
The Trust List Manager is responsible for: 
 issuing of the ECTL according to the common valid CP and regular activity 
reporting to the policy authority for the overall secure operation of C-ITS trust 
model,  
 reception of RCA certificates from the CPOC Entry, 
 the inclusion/exclusion of RCA certificates in ECTL upon notification by the Policy 
Authority, 
 the removal of a RCA certificate from an ECTL, when it is expired, so that it can be 
replaced by a new RCA certificate of the same RCA, 
 Signing of the ECTL, 
 Distribution of the ECTL on the public CPOC Web site. 
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C-ITS Point of Contact (CPOC) 
The CPOC is a unique entity appointed by the C-ITS Certificate Policy Authority. As 
described in Figure 2, the CPOC is divided in CPOC ENTRY, which is the end-point of the 
CPOC protocol to receive the RCA certificates and the CPOC WEB, which publishes the ECTL 
and other information. 
 
Figure 2 Detailed view of the Common European Elements 
 
The CPOC ENTRY is the endpoint of the CPOC protocol to collect the RCA certificates from 
the RCAs. The CPOC ENTRY is responsible for: 
 establishing and contributing to the secure communication exchange between all 
entities of the C-ITS trust model, 
 reviewing the procedural change requests and recommendations submitted by 
other trust model participants (i.e., RCAs), 
 transmitting the RCA certificates to the Trust List Manager, 
 
The CPOC WEB is a website maintained by the JRC administration that publishes the ECTL 
together with other information related to the deployment of C-ITS, e.g. additional 
guidelines or policy documents. The CPOC WEB is responsible for: 
 the publication of the common trust anchor (EtsiTS103097Certificate of the Trust 
List Manager containing its public key, as well as any associated link certificates) 
following the structure2 foreseen in [5],  
 publication of the ECTL following the structure3 foreseen in [5], 
 publication of other information related to the deployment of the C-ITS  
 
This report is focused on the CPOC protocol between the CPOC ENTRY and the RCAs. 
A more detailed view of the central element structure is provided in Figure 2. 
                                           
2 Note: To establish the initial trust between TLM and manufacturer, an additional out of band delivery of the TLM 
certificate to the manufacturer will be performed (to be defined by the TLM). The ECTL is signed as described 
in [5]. In case a new TLM certificate is created by the TLM (re-keying), the new self-signed TLM certificate 
(selfSignedTLMCertificate of type EtsiTS103097Certificate) will be inserted inside the ECTL. In addition, 
a linkTLMCertificate of type EtsiTS103097Certificate is going to be inserted in the ECTL (in accordance to 
the definitions of TlmEntry in section A.2.7. of [5], and the text of Section 5.6.1 of the CP [2]). This 
linkTLMCertificate will as well be published outside of the ECTL on the CPOC website.  
3 Note: Following the definitions of RootCaEntry in section A.2.7. of [5], and Section 5.6.2 of the CP [2], the 
ECTL will contain the self signed RCA certificates (selfsignedRootCa of type EtsiTS103097Certificate) and 
all RCA link certificates (linkRootCaCertificate of type EtsiTS103097Certificate) that have been received 
via the CPOC ENTRY interface from RCAs, in case the re-keying of the RCA certificates has been performed 
by the RCAs.  
9 
The terms CPOC ENTRY and CPOC WEB will be used in the rest of this report. Each of the 
components is also equipped with a repository to store the relevant data (e.g., RCA 
certificates). The CPOC ENTRY and CPOC WEB is expected to be implemented and operated 
on European Commission premises at DG Joint Research Centre, Via Enrico Fermi, 2749, 
21027 Ispra (VA), Italy. 
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3 CPOC protocol 
3.1 Conventions and Definitions 
All message structures are defined in ASN.1 and encoded using the Canonical Octet 
Encoding Rules (C-OER) [1]. This means that that all messages structure are defined in 
ASN.1 using the same Canonical Octet Encoding Rules (C-OER) as defined in [4]. However, 
the Annex of this document is currently only for potential future use, as a manual protocol 
will be used for the delivery of root CA certificates.  
The definitions of [2] apply. Further, the following definitions apply in this document: 
 application form: the application form is a paper-based document that originates 
from RCA applicants and is transmitted to the CPA. It is signed by the RCA AR. 
Amongst other elements defined in [2], the application form includes a hash of the 
RCA certificate.  
 application approval: the application approval is a paper-based document that 
originates from the CPA and is transmitted to RCA applicants. This document can 
be digitalised by e.g. creating a PDF of the document. Once digitalised, a hash of 
the signed application approval can be created and is used in the workflow of this 
document. 
3.2 Main flows 
The following three main flows are defined for the CPOC-RCA protocol: 
1. Add a new Root Certificate. This flow is used to add a new RCA certificate. This 
approach is used when either 1) the RCA certificate is new, or 2) when the RCA 
certificate requires no linkage to a prior RCA certificate4. 
2. Add a new Root Certificate with linkage to previous root. In this case, the 
new RCA Certificate is added in conjunction with a link Certificate (see [2]) that 
cryptographically binds it to the current/valid trustable RCA Certificate. 
3. RCA Certificate Revocation. In this case, the operator of a RCA can use the 
mechanisms of this section to request that the RCA is revoked from the ECTL. 
Each of these flows are described in the following subsections. The first two flows are 
described in section 3.3 below. The third flow is described in subsection 3.4. 
3.3 RCA-CPOC: Addition of a new RCA 
This section provides the protocol steps between a RCA organization and CPOC to securely 
support both scenarios to add a new root Certificate: Add a new RCA Certificate and 
Add a new RCA Certificate with linkage to previous RCA Certificate. 
3.3.1 Assurance Goals 
The following assurance goals need to be satisfied. 
Note that the following sections and table do also incorporate elements of the Certificate 
Policy [2]. The related sections of the Certificate Policy are described accordingly. 
 
  
                                           
4 This case is not defined at this moment at writing the report, but it is inserted for future reference. 
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Table 1: Assurance Goals between the CPOC Entry and RCAs: ‘Root Certificate Addition’ and ‘Add a 
new Root Certificate with linkage to previous root’ 
Goal Notes 
(Prior to CPOC ENTRY/RCA 
Interaction) 
 
The audited5 system is the system 
that generated the self-signed RCA 
certificate 
 
 
(Prior to CPOC ENTRY/RCA 
Interaction) 
 
The RCA Certificate is valid 
 
Minimally, the hash of the RCA certificate and any 
metadata (internal certificate fields such as 
validity period, issuance permissions (PSID-
SSPs), etc. as specified in the CP [2]) associated 
with the RCA certificate needs to be provided to 
the CPA in the application form (in fact the hash 
of the Root-CA certificate is part of the application 
form as described in [2]). The process to validate 
the RCA Certificate is described in the CP in 
section 4.1.2.1. 
 
(Prior to CPOC ENTRY/RCA 
Interaction) 
 
The RCA certificate is bound to a 
valid Application (for adding it to the 
ECTL)  
 
While there is limited need for this capability 
today, a future updated European C-ITS trust 
model may need to constrain the applications and 
permissions issuance rights of a RCA certificate6. 
 
In terms of the European CPA, this is simply an 
additional (future) check that may need to be 
performed by the CPA when reviewing the 
application form and validating the RCA 
certificate according to CP [2]. 
 
(Prior to CPOC ENTRY/Root 
Interaction) 
 
Validation Checks are performed and 
verified for the RCA certificates as 
specified in the CP [2]. 
 
Validation checks as specified in the CP [2]. See 
description of the detailed flow in section 3.3. 
 
Submission of the new RCA 
certificate via the CPOC ENTRY (to 
the TLM) can only be accomplished 
with a valid application approval 
 
A strong consistency check is needed to correlate 
the application approval with:  
1) the self-signed RCA certificate and hash of the 
RCA certificate7  
2) the RCA organization 
                                           
5 Audited means that the RCA has successfully passed the auditing process by an accredited PKI auditor according 
to the CP. 
6 Informative note: For example, at the time of writing this report, the US Proof of Concept Security Credential 
Management System (SCMS) includes no issuance constraints on application (Provider Service Identifier – 
PSID) or Security Specific Permissions (SSP). This will likely change, however, as the governance model 
matures and root certificates (and their operators) are constrained into specific application and/or 
permissions issuance domains. Certain types of credentials related to police, fire and other first responders 
may require special issuance entitlements. 
7 It is important that the hash of the RCA certificate is not disclosed to parties external to the organization 
responsible for the root CA. 
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Goal Notes 
3) the self-signed RCA certificate that is 
presented/uploaded to the CPOC ENTRY.  
The applicable procedure for approval is 
described in detail in the CP [2] (chapter 4.1.2). 
4) the CPOC Entry will also check the hash of the 
digitized form (e.g., PDF file) of the application 
approval. 
The entity requesting the addition or 
removal of RCA information with the 
CPOC ENTRY is authorized to make 
the request associated with the 
indicated credentials 
The RCA representatives making the request is 
the entity with the credentials specified in the CP 
[2] (sections 3.2.2.1 and 3.2.3.1). 
 
 
3.3.2 High Level Flow 
 
The high-level flow is depicted below: 
 
Figure 3: Root Certificate Management - High Level Flow (note that this is a subset of Figure 2 in the 
Certificate Policy [2])) 
New RCA certificates – whether to be trusted explicitly within the TLM-signed ECTL, or 
additionally trusted via a linkage to a previous Root Certificate – may be added only after 
the RCA organization has successfully applied and received approval from the CPA for the 
addition of a Root Certificate.  
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NOTE: The process for the approval of a RCA by the CPA is described in the Certificate 
Policy [2]. In addition, the cryptographic material (i.e., RCA certificate) is validated 
following the procedure described in this document. In addition, the CPA provides the 
application approval to the CPOC Entry, which calculates the hash of the digital form of the 
application approval for each approved root CA and stores it for future use. 
Any operation on the CPOC protocol will also be logged and recorded in the DG JRC 
administration files. The DG JRC administration can also record the identifier for the 
approval, which is an IA5String containing this official identifying number.  
3.3.3 Protocol Description 
A manual protocol is defined for this interface. 
The protocol is based on and will use the ASN.1 structures defined in ETSI standards [4] 
and [5]. The format of the RCA certificate and the linkCertificate is defined as 
EtsiTs103097Certificate defined in [4]. 
3.3.3.1 Prerequisites 
 
1. (Authenticators) Authorized Representative authenticators (defined in the C-ITS 
Certificate policy, sections 3.2.2.1 and 3.2.3.1) have been pre-shared: 
a. The RCA organization and Authorized Representative identification and 
authentication information been conveyed to the Certificate Policy Authority 
(CPA) and validated.  
b. The RCA Authorized Representative authenticators are known to the CPOC 
ENTRY. The CPA has securely shared this information with the CPOC ENTRY 
ahead of time and out-of-band of the RCA / CPOC ENTRY interface. 
c. CPOC ENTRY Authorized Representative authenticators are known to the 
RCA Authorized Representative. The CPA has securely shared this 
information with the RCA Authorized Representative ahead of time and 
out-of-band of the RCA / CPOC ENTRY interface. The identification 
information of the RCA representative is defined in section 3.2.3 of the CP 
[2]. 
2. The RCA has been audited successfully according to the CP [2]: 
a. In addition to the audit procedure, specified in CP [2], this document also 
recommends (i.e., recommended steps and not mandatory step) the 
following: (If the new RCA Credential was already generated) there was 
sufficient evidence (e.g., witness documentation and verification) to validate 
that the audited system indeed generated the RCA certificate AND that only 
the audited system (and any authorized, documented backups) maintain the 
self-signed root private key. This could be performed via an auditor-
witnessed root signing operation (over challenge data) that successfully 
verifies with the RCA’s public key. 
b. The audit has been passed, including successful authentication of auditor’s 
credentials 
c. The auditor’s audit report has been provided back to the applicant RCA 
organization. 
d. The Accredited PKI Auditor has successfully completed and submitted its 
Audit Report to the RCA (CP Flow 36)  
3. The new (or existing) RCA organization has completed and submitted a valid 
application form (CP Flow 14) in conjunction with the Accredited PKI Audit Report 
(CP Flow 16) to the Certificate Policy Authority (CPA). In case the RCA intends to 
optionally make use of the remote notification for revocation (see section 3.4), the 
RCA organization shall also provide the necessary information to identify the RCA 
RA through eIDAS (e.g., identifiers, eIDAS provider) to the CPA.  
4. The CPA shall execute the following steps: 
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a. Collect the RCA Authorized Representative information that the CPOC ENTRY 
will use to authenticate when delivering the self-signed RCA certificate, 
b. validate the RCA Authorized Representative identification and authentication 
data, as described in the Certificate Policy [2], 
c. securely convey the application approval (including the approval identifier 
and the approval time) in digital form (i.e., PDF file) to the RCA (CP Flow 4 
[2]). A paper copy can also be provided to the RCA Authorized 
Representative. 
d. securely convey the pplication approval (including the approval identifier and 
the approval time) and/or its metadata to the TLM and CPOC ENTRY (CP [2] 
Flow 1). The eIDAS information shall also be provided to the CPOC ENTRY, 
if the RCA RA provided it in the previous step. The CPOC ENTRY will calculate 
the hash of the application approval in digital form for future use. 
 
Note: the approval documents and the outcome of an approval request (either successful 
or unsuccessful) will be recorded in the DG JRC administration system as well.  
 
3.3.3.2 Detailed description of the Manual Flow 
The ASN.1 encoded data structures according to the ETSI standards [4] and [5] are 
transferred by manual delivery via temporary storage devices (e.g., external hard drive, 
USB flash drive, tokens) by the RCA AR to the CPOC ENTRY. 
The following procedure applies to any interaction between RCAs and the CPOC ENTRY that 
want to take part in the EU CCMS. This manual protocol with the required physical presence 
of root CA representatives travelling to the CPOC ENTRY applies both for the initial 
enrolment of a root CA, as well as for all re-keying operations of root CA certificates. The 
European Commission DG JRC acting as the CPOC only supports this protocol at this 
moment in time. 
In the future, this protocol may be revised to allow other methods of interaction with the 
CPOC ENTRY in line with the CP (e.g. via a secure communication protocol sending RCA 
link certificates remotely). However, this initial version of the CPOC protocol under the 
governance of the European Commission does not support any such possibility.  
1. Following section 4.1.2.1. of the CP [2] the RCA’s Authorized Representative (AR) 
shall: 
a. travel to the CPOC ENTRY, in possession of the following: 
 physical media containing  
1. the self-signed RCA Certificate formatted as a 
EtsiTs103097Certificate structure according to [4] 
2. in case of an re-keying of the RCA certificate, the new RCA 
self-signed certificate and the link certificate (certificate 
signed with the current valid private key) shall be formatted 
as an EtsiTs103097Certificate according to [4]. 
 its Authorized Representative authenticators as defined in the CP 
[2] (in particular, sections 3.2.2.1 and 3.2.3.1) 
 the CPA-authenticated application approval (including the unique 
approval identifier and the approval time) received from the CPA. 
 Additional information and data required by the CP [2]. 
b. Authenticate the CPOC’s Authorized Representative (AR) using the CPA 
provisioned CPOC ENTRY authenticators (provided in CP Flow 1) 
c. Provide his/her own Authorized Representative identification/authentication 
materials to the CPOC ENTRY AR. 
1. The CPOC ENTRY AR shall: 
a. Authenticate the RCA AR based on its presented credentials 
b. Verify the root’s application approval received out-of-band from the CPA is 
the same as that presented by the RCA AR: 
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 Match the RCA application approval against the approval 
document hash information provided out-of-band from the CPA to 
the TLM/CPOC ENTRY (see step 4.d in paragraph 3.3.3.1). This is 
accomplished by generating a hash of the received digital 
document and comparing to the known hash. 
 The RCA’s Authorized representative identifiers match 
 (If there are any miss-matches, the operation is discontinued, 
logged and the mismatch is investigated) 
c. On a secure, isolated system: 
 Insert the RCA’s physical token (e.g., USB drive) and extract the 
RCA add/remove message data for validation. This is the self-
signed RCA certificate and optionally link certificate from the 
ECTL. 
 Generate a hash over any RCA certificates being added to the 
ECTL. The hash of the RCA certificates is stored in the CPOC 
ENTRY and also used for revocation of the RCA certificate (i.e. 
delta ECTL). 
d. For any RCA certificate being added to the ECTL,  
 Check that the generated Hash equals the Hash of the RCA 
certificate (already verified to be equal to that on the RCA AR’s 
presented approval form). In addition all the parameters and 
signatures in the RCA certificate must also be verified. These 
parameters are also listed on the application form (see CP [2]). 
 It is recommended (but not mandatory) to validate that the 
upload datetime is within the ‘upload window’, a period of time 
during which the approved upload (or indicated revocation) may 
be performed (approvals made too far in the past should be 
reinvestigated by the CPA before the upload is allowed to 
proceed).  
Note that the approval time are recorded by the DG JRC 
administration and the CPOC ENTRY repository. 
 In case of an update of a RCA certificate, where hence a link 
certificate is provided: validate the signature over the RCA link 
certificate (using the old RCA’s public key. Verify the self-signed 
signature of the new certificate and validate all parameters.  
 (If there are any miss-matches, the operation is discontinued, logged and the 
mismatch is investigated) 
 If all checks pass, successfully, the CPOC ENTRY shall: 
 Transfer the digital copy of RCA certificate (and the link RCA 
certificate in case of an update of a RCA certificate,) to the TLM 
via interface over CP Flow 8 [2],  
 Log the successful procedure and transfer to the TLM 
 Provide an accounting receipt to the RCA AR, indicating: 
1. Identifiers of the CPOC ENTRY AR 
2. Identifiers of the RCA AR 
3. Receipt Date and Time 
4. Date and Time of the Root addition 
5. Planned Publication Date in the ECTL 
6. Hash of the new RCA 
7. Hash of the associated digital application approval 
Note: the outcome and the digital artefacts collected and produced in the steps above will 
be recorded in the DG JRC administration system as well.  
 
16 
3.3.4 Errors and exceptions 
This section provides the ASN.1 errors the CPOC ENTRY may return to the Root. The full 
list of errors is as follows, followed by a description of only those errors that pertain to 
Root certificate upload requests. 
 
ErrorCode ::= CHOICE { 
    representativeAuthorizationFailed          INTEGER(0),  
    uploadPeriodNotStarted                     INTEGER(1), 
    approvalNotFound                           INTEGER(2),   
    rootCACertificateSignatureFailed           INTEGER(3),   
    rootCACertificateFormatFailure             INTEGER(4), 
    rootCACertificateValidityPeriodOutOfBounds INTEGER(5), 
    linkageSignatureFailed                     INTEGER(6), 
    linkageRootUnknown                         INTEGER(7), 
    requestedRevocationDatetimeTooFarInFuture  INTEGER(8),  
    rootCertificateNotFound                    INTEGER(9),  
    hashCollision                              INTEGER(10),  
    requestMessageNotAcknowledgedOrReceived    INTEGER(11), 
    hashapplicationapprovalfailure           INTEGER(12), 
    ...     
} 
representativeAuthorizationFailed 
The CPOC ENTRY checks that the Root AR’s credentials are applicable to the requested 
operation. If not, this error is returned to indicate that the requestor (Root AR) was not 
authorized to perform the requested operation.  
uploadPeriodNotStarted  
The CPOC ENTRY returns this error to the RCA representative if the requested operation 
was performed too early, per the time window provided by the CPA to the Root and CPOC 
ENTRY. 
approvalNotFound 
The CPOC ENTRY returns this error to the RCA representative if the hash of the RCA's 
indicated application approval was not found. 
rootCACertificateSignatureFailed 
The CPOC ENTRY returns this error to the RCA representative if signature verification of 
the new RCA cert failed (signature mismatch) 
rootCACertificateFormatFailure 
The CPOC ENTRY returns this error to the RCA representative if the CPOC ENTRY is unable 
to read the Root Certificate due to incorrect formatting or encoding. 
rootCACertificateValidityPeriodOutOfBounds  
The CPOC ENTRY returns this error to the RCA representative if the CPOC ENTRY receives 
the new Root Certificate and its validity period does not overlap the CPA-allowed certificate 
upload window. 
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linkageSignatureFailed 
The CPOC ENTRY returns this error to the RCA representative if the uploaded linkCertificate 
fails to verify (the old root signature over the new root failed). 
linkageRootUnknown  
The CPOC ENTRY returns this error to the RCA representative if the old root used to sign 
the new root (as contained in the linkCertificate) is unknown to the TLM/CPOC ENTRY 
and/or is not contained in the ECTL. 
hashCollision 
The CPOC ENTRY returns this error to the RCA representative if the HashedId8 of the 
submitted root certificate is identical to the HashedId8 of a root certificate that is already 
on the ECTL. Since revocation on the CTL identifies a revoked root certificate by its 
HashedId8, it is a requirement that all root certificates have different HashedId8s to ensure 
that revocation statements are unambiguous. 
requestMessageNotAcknowledgedOrReceived 
The CPOC ENTRY returns this error to the RCA representative if the CPOC ENTRY receives 
a status request message for a request message it did not receive (i.e., the hash of the 
indicated, original request is unknown) 
Hashapplicationapprovalfailure 
The CPOC ENTRY returns this error to the RCA representative if the CPC ENTRY receives 
an application approval, whose hash does not match the recorded hash for the application 
approval of that RCA. 
 
3.4 RCA-CPOC ENTRY: RCA Certificate Revocation 
This section describes the RCA to CPOC ENTRY RCA revocation protocol, which implies the 
deletion of a RCA certificate. 
 
3.4.1 Overview 
The operator of a RCA can use the mechanisms of this section to request that the RCA is 
revoked on the ECTL. In this interface, the RCA and CPOC ENTRY Authorized 
representatives mutually authenticate each other, the Root provides the CPOC ENTRY with 
a hash of the to-be-revoked Root certificate, and the CPOC ENTRY acknowledges the 
removal request. 
Building upon section 7.3.1 of the CP [2], for the purpose of this CPOC protocol the RCA 
certificate revocation are described in the following scenarios: 
 Scenario 1: The compromise or suspected compromise of a RCA system. If the 
compromise or suspected compromise is considered of critical importance by the 
RCA management entity and/or the CPA, the removal of the associated RCA 
certificate from the ECTL should be executed as soon as possible. See section 
3.4.3.2 of this report for details. 
 Scenario 2: The need to upgrade an entire certificate chain’s cryptographic 
algorithm type/strength, 
 Scenario 3: Activities originating from an organizational, industry or regulatory 
change to the C-ITS trust model or new policies that warrant root certificate 
replacement. 
 Scenario 4: RCA managing entity exiting the market. 
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Since RCA revocation may have a significant impact on the C-ITS system, if it is possible 
for the RCA operator to give advance notice of the revocation to the TLM, this should be 
done to enable the impact to be gauged and mitigations to be planned. 
The assurance goals for this component of the interface are as follows. 
 
Table 2: RCA Revocation High Level Assurance Goals 
Goal Notes 
Root revocation is performed only for 
the authorized party 
The RCA entity making the request needs to be 
authorized to request revocation on the specified 
root certificate. 
Revocation actions need to be 
coordinated in time with other 
activities.  
RCAs need to be able to specify a future point in 
time before which the revocation will not be 
performed. 
 
Root certificate revocation is an informative process. Policy shall require notification ahead 
of time to the CPA so that possibly wide-ranging impacts to the C-ITS system are gauged 
and understood.  
 
3.4.2 Data Structures 
RCA Revocation shall be performed using the following ASN.1 data structure: 
 
RevokeRoot ::= SEQUENCE { 
    rootCAHash              HashedId32,            -- the hash of the RootCA certificate to be revoked 
    revocationNotBefore     Time32 OPTIONAL,       -- the earliest requested datetime the RootCA Cert 
may be removed from the ECTL (if requested) 
    ... 
} 
 
 
3.4.3 Protocol Description 
3.4.3.1 Prerequisites:  
1. Authorized Representative authenticators (C-ITS Certificate policy [2], sections 
3.2.2.1 and 3.2.3.1) have been pre-shared 
2. The CPA has a policy indicating how far in the future a revocation request can be 
made. 
3. The RCA Authorized Representative has informed the CPA of the intent to revoke 
a root credential. This information shall include the intended revocation date, 
which is within the policy constraint. 
3.4.3.2 Detailed description of the flow 
Note: the first two steps are different depending on the scenarios identified in section 
3.4.1. If a RCA needs the urgent revocation of its RCA because the first case (compromise 
or suspected compromise of a RCA system) has been assessed as a critical compromise, 
the first two steps will be implemented in a different way: 
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Flow for Scenarios 2,3,4 (and 1 when it is not considered critical or urgent) 
according to chapter 3.4.1: 
1. The RCA Authorized Representative shall travel to the CPOC ENTRY. 
2. The RCA and CPOC ENTRY ARs shall mutually authenticate according to the CP [2]. If 
authentication fails, STOP and notify the CPA; otherwise PROCEED. 
3. The RCA Authorized Representative shall populate, date and sign a Root Revocation 
form (i.e. revocation request in addition to the CRL from [2]) that indicates the following 
information: 
 RCA Authorized Representative identifying information 
 RCA certificate identifying information: 
o HashedId32 of the RCA Certificate 
o Original expiration date of RCA Certificate 
o The requested revocation time, which is indicated either: 
 1. with an envisaged maximum time frame8, OR 
 2. Next ECTL Publication time 
4. The RCA Authorized Representative shall: 
 present a storage device (e.g., thumb drive) containing a valid signed RevokeRoot 
message, 
 present the application approval. 
 
Flow for Scenario 1 when it is considered critical or urgent according to chapter 
3.4.1: 
1. The RCA Authorized Representative can choose to not physically travel to the CPOC 
ENTRY. 
2. Instead, The RCA Authorized Representative shall send an email to the CPOC ENTRY 
(MOVE-JRC-C-ITS-POLICY-AUTHORITY@ec.europa.eu) with a request for revocation with 
the following information: 
 A document containing the revocation information (i.e. according to [2] the CRL in 
digital form, which includes the hash of the root CA certificate to be revoked and 
the application approval) signed by the RCA AR requesting the revocation of its 
own RCA certificate. 
 HashedId32 of the RCA Certificate 
 Original expiration date of RCA Certificate 
 The requested revocation time, which is either: 
1. Within an envisaged maximum time frame9, OR 
2. Next ECTL Publication time 
The digital document in the e-mail request shall be signed using the eIDAS system. [6] 
 
3. The RCA and CPOC ENTRY ARs shall mutually authenticate by additional remote 
communication. The CPOC ENTRY will contact the physical representative of the RCA AR 
through phone or other secure means to confirm the request and the information defined 
in the previous step. If authentication fails, STOP and notify the CPA; otherwise PROCEED. 
 
From this point, the flow is common for all the cases identified in Scenarios 
1,2,3,4: 
                                           
8 Which according to the CP [2] will trigger a revocation as soon as possible and without undue delay. 
9 Which according to the CP [2] will trigger a revocation as soon as possible and without undue delay. 
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4. The CPOC ENTRY shall validate the following: 
 The RCA certificate exists (based on its HashedId32), is currently valid, and is 
published in the ECTL 
 The RCA Authorized Representative is entitled to represent the identified RCA 
certificate, and the representative’s credentials can be verified by the CPOC 
ENTRY 
 The requested revocation time is within the policy-constrained maximum time in 
the future 
 The provided hash of the application approval matches the recorded hash. 
5. If any validation checks fail, STOP and notify the CPA. Otherwise, PROCEED. 
6. The CPOC ENTRY shall provide the RCA Authorized Representative with the next ECTL 
publication date that will reflect the Root Certificate removal. 
7. The CPOC ENTRY shall provide an acknowledgement receipt to the RCA Authorized 
Representative, indicating:  
 Root revocation request is validated and approved 
 HashedId32 of the Root Certificate to be removed 
 Time of the approval Datetime  
 Planned ECTL publication date that will reflect the revocation CPOC ENTRY 
identifying information 
 
3.4.4 Errors and exceptions 
This section provides the ASN.1 errors the CPOC ENTRY may return to the Root upon its 
requesting a Root certificate revocation. The full list of errors is as follows, followed by a 
description of those errors that only pertain to Root revocation requests. 
 
ErrorCode ::= CHOICE { 
    representativeAuthorizationFailed          INTEGER(0),  
    uploadPeriodNotStarted                     INTEGER(1), 
    approvalNotFound                           INTEGER(2),   
    rootCACertificateSignatureFailed           INTEGER(3),   
    rootCACertificateFormatFailure             INTEGER(4), 
    rootCACertificateValidityPeriodOutOfBounds INTEGER(5), 
    linkageSignatureFailed                     INTEGER(6), 
    linkageRootUnknown                         INTEGER(7), 
    requestedRevocationDatetimeTooFarInFuture  INTEGER(8),  
    rootCertificateNotFound                    INTEGER(9),  
    requestMessageNotAcknowledgedOrReceived    INTEGER(11), 
    ...     
} 
Only the new fields in comparison to section 3.3.4 are described. 
representativeAuthorizationFailed 
The CPOC ENTRY checks that the Root AR’s credentials are applicable to the requested 
operation. If not, this error is returned to indicate that the requestor (Root AR) was not 
authorized to perform the requested operation.  
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requestMessageNotAcknowledgedOrReceived 
The CPOC ENTRY returns this error to the Root if the CPOC ENTRY receives a status request 
message for a request message it did not receive (i.e., the hash of the indicated, original 
request is unknown) 
requestedRevocationDatetimeTooFarInFuture 
The CPOC ENTRY returns this error to the Root if the CPOC ENTRY detects that the 
requested revocation is too far in the future, by policy. 
rootCertificateNotFound 
The CPOC ENTRY returns this error to the Root if the Root’s requested revocation is for a 
Root Certificate (based on its hash) that the CPOC ENTRY/TLM is not aware of and is not 
in the ECTL.  
 
  
22 
4 Conclusions 
This report provides a description of the protocol between the CPOC Entry and the RCAs in 
the EU CCMS. As described in the report, this is a manual protocol, where representatives 
from the RCAs will come to the CPOC facilities (at the European Commission premises of 
DG JRC in Ispra, Italy) to provide the RCA certificate and additional information when 
needed. The various root certificates are then given to the Trust List Manager, which are 
subsequently published via the ECTL on the CPOC web site. Further, the mechanisms for 
revocation and interaction with the CPOC is described. 
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5 Annex: ASN.1 definitions for potential future use 
 
This annex describes the ASN.1 definition for the data types, which are defined apart from 
the ones already defined in ETSI standards for potential future use within the CPOC 
protocol: 
ETSI TS 103 097  V1.3.1 [4] 
and 
ETSI TS 102 941 V1.2.1 [5] 
 
CpocProtocol  
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) european-commission(130) information-systems(1) c-
its-systems(3) cpocProtocol (1) version1(1)} 
 
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN 
 
IMPORTS 
 
EtsiTs103097Certificate  
FROM EtsiTs103097Module 
{itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(103097) v1(0)} 
 
Time32, Uint8 
FROM Ieee1609dot2BaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111)  
    standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609)   
    dot2(2) base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2)} 
 
 
; 
 
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
-- 
--            RCA / CPOC ENTRY interface   
 
-- 
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
-- SignedCpocRootCaPDU is the top-most message type 
-- This structure is enclosed in an Ieee1609Dot2Data of content type SignedData per  
-- ETSI 103097 Clause 5.2.  
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-- The ITS-AID for CTL service is allocated in the ISO AID registration table and the value 
is specified in ETSI TS 102 965 V1.4.1 [10] 
 
RootCaCpocPDU ::= SEQUENCE { 
    version         Uint8, 
    messageContent  CpocRootMessage, 
    ... 
} 
 
CpocRootMessage ::= CHOICE { 
    request         CpocRootRequestMessage, 
    response        CpocRootResponseMessage, 
    ... 
} 
 
CpocRootRequestMessage ::= SEQUENCE { 
    requestTime     Time32, 
    content         CpocRootRequest, 
    ... 
} 
CpocRootRequest ::= CHOICE { 
    addRootWithoutLinkage AddRootWithoutLinkage, 
    addRootWithLinkage    AddRootWithLinkage, 
    revokeRoot            RevokeRoot, 
    statusRequest         CpocRootStatusRequest, 
    ... 
} 
AddRootWithoutLinkage ::= AddRoot (WITH COMPONENTS {..., 
    linkageInfo           ABSENT 
  }) 
 
AddRootWithLinkage ::= AddRoot (WITH COMPONENTS {..., 
    linkageInfo           PRESENT 
  }) 
 
AddRoot ::= SEQUENCE { 
    rootCert              EtsiTs103097Certificate,        
    linkageInfo           EtsiTs103097Certificate OPTIONAL, -- Root certificate signed by old 
root 
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    rootCertApprovalTime  Time32,     -- Approval time provided by the CPA 
    rootCertApprovalId    IA5String,  -- Identifier for Root Certificate approval from CPA 
    ... 
} 
 
RevokeRoot ::= SEQUENCE { 
    rootCAHash              HashedId32,            -- the hash of the RootCA certificate being 
revoked 
    revocationNotBefore     Time32 OPTIONAL,       -- the earliest requested datetime the 
RootCA Cert may be removed from the ECTL (if requested) 
    ... 
} 
 
CpocRootStatusRequest ::= SEQUENCE { 
     -- Hash of the encoded RequestMessage for which the Root is requesting status 
     -- This is only for asynchronous use in an automated protocol 
    requestHash           HashedId32,                                      
    ... 
} 
 
-- CPOC-to-RootCA Response Message 
CpocRootResponseMessage ::= SEQUENCE { 
    responseTime    Time32, 
    requestHash     HashedId32,  -- hash of request message to which this response 
message corresponds 
    content         ResponseContent, 
    ... 
} 
 
-- the request has been successfully processed. RCA will be added/removed in the next 
ECTL update 
ResponseContent ::= CHOICE { 
    success        INTEGER(0),  
    errors         SEQUENCE OF ErrorCode, 
    ... 
} 
 
ErrorCode ::= CHOICE { 
    representativeAuthorizationFailed          INTEGER(0),  
    uploadPeriodNotStarted                     INTEGER(1), 
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    uploadPeriodExpired                        INTEGER(2), 
    approvalNotFound                           INTEGER(3),   
    rootCACertificateSignatureFailed           INTEGER(4),   
    rootCACertificateFormatFailure             INTEGER(5), 
    rootCACertificateValidityPeriodOutOfBounds INTEGER(6), 
    linkageSignatureFailed                     INTEGER(7), 
    linkageRootUnknown                         INTEGER(8), 
    requestedRevocationDatetimeTooFarInFuture  INTEGER(9),  
    rootCertificateNotFound                    INTEGER(10),  
    hashCollision                              INTEGER(11),  
    requestMessageNotAcknowledgedOrReceived    INTEGER(12), 
    ...     
} 
 
  
HashedId32::= OCTET STRING (SIZE (32))  
 
END 
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